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Abstract 
In this paper, I model the relationship between potential voters and a politician, who can pay citizens 
to vote for him – vote buying – or to show up to vote – turnout buying. This model is used to explore 
the optimal budget allocation across districts, focusing on single-member majoritarian elections in a 
multi-district environment in which only the incumbent can engage in vote and turnout buying. The 
results enrich the distributive politics literature by showing that a campaign with direct voting is 
optimally focused on the opposition strongholds, rather than on swing or core states. I need strong 
evidence for this result using Argentinian electoral data disaggregated at the booth level, and spending 
data from a poverty relief program. I show that in the month prior to the 2003 Argentine presidential 
election, the incumbent party spent more money on groups that were ideologically skewed toward the 
opposition. Consequently, those districts turned out more, and voted more for the incumbent, who had 
transferred the money. Furthermore, to isolate actual campaign spending from campaign promises, I 
use Argentina's 2001 economic and political turmoil as a natural experiment. The empirical evidence 
confirms that in a single-member district election without an electoral college the incumbent candidate 
allocates more resources where the marginal cost per vote is lower, that is, in opposition strongholds. 
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1 Introduction
Elections are arguably the main institutional feature of any democracy; however, rather than
aggregating the preferences of the electorate, electoral outcomes might be suspected of being skewed
by other features: the candidates campaign in the form of advertising, spending, campaign promises,
persuasion and mobilization strategies, etc. Therefore, understanding the effect of these features
also becomes central to understanding the electoral processes. While the existing literature forecasts
that candidates focus their efforts either on safe (core) or close (swing) districts, we show that a third
hypothesis should also be considered: candidates find it optimal to focus on opposition strongholds
in direct majoritarian elections with individually targeted spending.
Generally, campaigns based on mass comunication can be easily measured with objective vari-
ables (advertising, campaign spending, etc). However in the developing world “campaign efforts”
are believed to be concentrated in less institutionalized forms of campaigning, such as the distri-
bution of cash, liquor, food, and other items (Banerjee et al. (2010)). These kinds of individually
targeted efforts either mobilize voters to the polling booths, or persuade them to vote for a particu-
lar candidate. We first model this relationship (between politicians who give handouts and citizens)
in terms of turnout and vote buying, in order to find out the optimal level of individual handouts.
Then we aggregate the results across districts to investigate in which ones office-motivated politi-
cians allocate greater spending. We show that the largest bang-for-the-buck occurs in opposition
strongholds.
When democratic institutions preserve the secret ballot, and politicians cannot make binding
promises (Keefer and Vlaicu (2008)), the transaction between parties and voters faces a “double
credibility” problem that shapes the exchange of votes and resources. For instance, if a party aims
to mobilize a group of voters, it is relatively easy to monitor their turnout decisions. However,
each individual’s choice in the polling booth is private. We show that if voters perceive a positive
probability of being monitored, the voters’ credibility issue is partially solved (Stokes (2005), Gerber
et al. (2011), Gerber et al. (2009), Gerber et al. (2008)). Similarly, parties cannot credibly commit
to fulfilling their promises after the election. We tackle this problem by letting the transactions
occur before voting takes place, i.e. transfers are upfront payments.
The theoretical literature has focused either on vote buying or turnout buying strategies in
different contexts. For instance, in the case of large elections and full information on the ideology
of voters, Stokes (2005) finds that vote buying should be aimed at “weak opposers” and “indifferent”
voters, while Nichter (2008) finds that turnout buying should be aimed at “weak supporters”. On
the contrary, in Dekel et al. (2008) the optimal vote-buying strategy is independent of the voters’
preferred party, and Herrera et al. (2008) assume that the effectiveness of targeted mobilization is
exogenous. Related to our multi-district approach, the only literature that looks at the optimal
allocation of resources across districts is that on distributive politics. Its framework only accounts
for persuasion strategies and provides mixed results. For instance, Cox and McCubbins (1986) finds
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that parties focus on “core supporters”, while Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) predicts the opposite,
that parties spend more resources on “swing” (or indifferent) voters.
However, when persuasion and mobilization strategies are considered simultaneously in a large
election, and the ideology of voters is not known by the incumbent party, our multi-district approach
delivers new results. First, if ideologies were public knowledge, parties would find that vote buying is
the best strategy in every district, as it is more cost-effective. Second, since ideologies are private to
the citizens, the incumbent party exploits the observable characteristics of districts to discriminate
among them. And within each district it offers the same transfer to all citizens because they are
ex-ante identical. Third, given the platforms, the incumbent party allocates more resources and
pays larger individual transfers in “opposing districts” rather than in “swing” or “core districts”.
This result is novel in the literature as it predicts that the incumbent focuses on those districts
where the challenger is favored. Moreover, within our framework, Cox (2006)’s claim that large
shares of resources are received by the party’s supporters is also contemplated, as they receive
transfers even in opposing districts.. In particular, we find that if some opposers are persuaded by
the incumbent, then it is necessarily the case that, in the same district, the weak supporters are
mobilized and the core supporters receive transfers as well.
The rationale for these results follows from the politicians’ limited knowledge of citizens’ prefer-
ences. Intuitively, the incumbent party, as a vote share maximizer, does not want to “waste” money
on voters that would vote for it even without the transfer. Hence, it moves away from relatively
safe districts - i.e. with many core supporters - in order to free up resources. In other words, when
politicians only know the distribution of ideologies in a given district rather than the individual
preferences, then the “vote buying politician” does not know whether he is giving a handout to a
citizen who would have voted for him anyway. Thus, he prefers to focus on districts where it is
more likely that he would target undecided voters, which occurs more often in districts with fewer
supporters.
We test the main theoretical prediction of our model, and we find evidence for our hypothesis
in the case of the 2003 presidential elections in Argentina. In particular, we show that the imple-
mentation of a government-run discretionary social program that consisted of cash disbursements
was skewed toward opposition districts in the month of the elections, and that indeed had the effect
of a political campaign. Furthermore, we estimate the average cost of persuading voters, which
ranged between 40 and 180 US dollars, depending on the econometric strategy.
Argentina’s 2003 presidential election is particularly appropriate as a case study, not only
because of the availability of very disaggregated electoral data but also because of the 2001 economic
and political crises, which can be exploited as a natural experiment. Following this strategy, we get
a measure of the ideological leaning of each district by solving a two-way causality problem between
spending and electoral results, pervasive in the literature. This endogeneity problem arises because
campaigns can take place in two different but not exclusive ways: one involves spending during the
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actual campaign (advertising, traveling, direct calls, mobilization strategies, vote buying, etc), and
the other one implies spending after winning (i.e. fulfilling campaign promises). Candidates usually
do both, therefore spending between elections might be a mix of fulfilling campaign promises and
mobilization and persuasion strategies for the following electoral cycle.1 The 2001 political turmoil
in Argentina allows us to isolate the 2003 spending campaign from spending promises related to
the previous 2001 electoral outcome.
We find that although the expenditures in the social program were mainly allocated to the
targeted population, they were largely skewed toward opposition strongholds. Moreover, in the
election, that spending had an impact favouring the incumbent’s candidate, consistently with the
hypothesis that the allocation of resources was viewed as campaign spending. Furthermore, using
a proxy for the “perceived probability of monitoring”, we also show that more monitoring induced
greater spending, and a higher turnout and vote for the incumbent. Finally, using a quite conser-
vative estimate of the cost of buying a vote - 96 US dollars - we calculate that around 750 thousand
votes were bought, which accounts for 20% of the votes obtained by the candidate who finally
became president.
Summing up, we first show theoretically that an office-motivated incumbent should allocate
greater transfers to opposition strongholds when persuasion and mobilization are considered simul-
taneously in a direct single-member district election and voters’ preferences are private knowledge.
Moreover, under this set-up, mobilization occurs mainly among weak supporters, and persuasion
among undecided voters and weak opposers. Second, we bring our predictions to the data, and
using Argentina’s turmoil as an exogenous shock we confirm that our hypothesis holds during the
2003 presidential elections, when we look at the discretionary allocation of a social programme
(Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar), mainly seen as clientelist spending during the months previous to
the election.
2 Related literature
The literature that studies this problem splits into two different branches. On one side, there
are papers that explain the individual decision-making of voters and parties (Why would anybody
sell a vote? For how much? Whose vote is cheaper to buy?). On the other, some papers study
the aggregate problem of distributive politics, i.e. the optimal allocation of spending/campaigning
resources to maximize the vote share (in our case, through mobilization and persuasion of voters)
across districts or groups.
Regarding the former, Dekel et al. (2008) solve for a vote-buying equilibrium with upfront
payments and campaign promises in a complete information model of multiple and sequential
bidding for voters. Voters sell their “voting rights” to the highest bidder and the party that gains
1The literature on Political Budget Cycles shows that spending during the year of the campaign increases in both
developed and developing countries, see Brender and Drazen (2005) and references therein.
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more perks from holding office wins. Stokes 2005 also studies vote buying, but this time as an
infinite game where the party plays with trigger strategies: it pays a transfer until it finds that
the voter has cheated. The ballot is cast secretly but there is an imperfect monitoring technology.
The model predicts that parties target “weak opposers” and “indifferent” voters, discriminating
against their own “strong supporters”, although Stokes’ empirical evidence suggest that parties are
more likely to target their own supporters (in addition to uneducated and poor citizens). Nichter
(2008) reproduces the same model but with turnout buying and perfect monitoring. He reaches
opposite conclusions: weak supporters are easier to buy. In both papers the common knowledge of
voters’ ideologies drives the results: indifferent and almost indifferent voters are cheaper to persuade
(because you do not buy the votes of people already voting for you), and supporters are cheaper
to mobilize.
Regarding the latter, the literature on campaigning and distributive politics studies the optimal
allocation of campaign “efforts” across states. Some empirical studies focus on the actual campaign
by looking at spending and/or visits to each state by the candidates. A different branch of this
literature studies the promises made during the campaign, measured as the pork-barrel spending
in each state, by the winner. This last approach assumes that the promises are credible, which,
although questionable, may be a plausible assumption in developed countries. Nonetheless, it is
unlikely to hold in the developing world.
Therefore, the problem is framed in terms of two competing hypotheses highlighted in the
theoretical literature: whether more resources should go to “swing” groups that - if convinced by
the promises or the spending - would change the outcome of the election (Dixit and Londregan
(1995), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)); or, on the contrary, whether the resources should be mainly
allocated to “core” groups, most responsive to the promises (or transfers), and so cheaper to
convince (Dixit and Londregan (1995), Cox and McCubbins (1986)).
Unfortunately, the evidence is ambiguous. Stromberg (2008) studies candidates visit to each
state in the US to conclude that candidates (optimally) spend more time in decisive swing states
(i.e. Florida and Pennsylvania in the 2004 election). On the other hand, Chen (2008) shows
the opposite using the FEMA hurricane-relief spending during 2004: greater spending in more
Republican districts is a vote-maximizing strategy for Republicans. Outside the US, Dahlberg
and Johansson (2002) shows that parties maximize the probability of winning by allocating larger
transfers to swing municipalities (before the elections); and Case (2001) shows a similar result for
the case of Albania.
Stromberg (2008) assumes that the candidates’ campaigns have an effect per se, while the
remaining papers in the previous paragraph look at spending before the election. In either case,
those expenditures are “public goods”, in the sense that any extra dollar spent is enjoyed by all
the voters in the district (i.e. advertisements). We also tackle credibility issues, which are present
in both branches of the literature. When democratic institutions preserve the secret ballot, and
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politicians cannot make binding promises (Keefer and Vlaicu (2008)), the transaction between
parties and voters faces a “double credibility” problem that shapes the exchange of votes and
resources. For instance, if a party aims to mobilize a group of voters, it is relatively easy to
monitor their turnout decisions. However, each individual’s choice in the polling booth is private.
Similarly, when a party spends resources on influencing a citizen’s vote, it is relatively difficult
to commit the voter to choosing this particular party. We find that if voters perceive a positive
probability of being monitored (Gerber et al. (2008)), the voters’ credibility issue is partially solved
(Stokes (2005)). At the same time, parties cannot credibly commit to fulfilling their promises after
the election. We solve this problem by letting the transactions occur before voting takes place,
i.e. transfers are upfront payments. Also, we focus on spending as “private goods” targeted at
individuals (i.e. calls rather than TV ads), in a direct majoritarian election.
Finally, the theoretical literature has a hard time reconciling the “swing district” hyphothesis
with another piece of evidence: loyalists (core constituents, or strong supporters) are the recipients
of a larger share of the transfers (Cox (2006)). Although some of the above models can accomodate
either result, the existent literature cannot explain both simultaneously. We suggest this follows
from assuming that ideologies are observed (either by the incumbent or his brokers or party leaders).
In the following sections of the paper we introduce the model (section (3)), where we discuss the
individual exchange of goods and services for votes, and then we show the results across districts.
Then, we explain the use of the Argentine crisis as a natural experiment, and we test the predictions
of the model (section (4)). Finally, we conclude.
3 The model
We first describe how the incumbent allocates his budget to persuade and/or mobilize voters in
a representative district, and then we look at the optimal allocation of the public funds across
districts.
In this economy, there are Nd eligible voters per district d, and two national political parties:
the incumbent I, and the opposition O, with fixed platforms, XI and XO, in the policy space
X ⊂ <. They compete for office in a single-member election, in which the party with more votes
across all districts is the winner.2 Both parties are purely office motivated, and the incumbent uses
federal funds to engage in “clientelist” competition by offering transfers to individuals, in such a
way that it maximizes I’s vote share VI . Here, we let only the incumbent engage in vote and turnout
buying to capture the incumbency’s spending advantages; however, following Roberson (2006), we
show in the appendix that this is without loss of generality.
Citizens derive utility from their policy payoff, from their voting behaviour, and from the
transfers. We consider each of these in detail below. Every citizen i in district d has a privately
2This is a single member district - SMD - election which is held across many localities or groups that I call districts.
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known ideology xi ∈ X, drawn from the cdf F d(x) with bounded support on X, unimodal, and
absolutely continuous.
Consider first the utility derived from policy (the outcome contingent utility). Since we focus on
large elections with a continuum of voters, the probability that a single vote is pivotal is zero for all
voters and, hence, independently of the citizen’s action, he always gets an expected policy payoff,
as it is commonly assumed in the literature (see for instance, Dekel et al. (2008)). For simplicity,
we do not write this expected policy payoff.
We now consider the utility derived from expressive voting (i.e. the act-contingent utility).3
All citizens get a direct benefit b and bear a direct cost related to turning out to vote. The cost
depends on the ideological distance to the party’s platform, quadratically. Hence, i’s voting payoff
is
b− (XP − xi)2 if i votes for party P ∈ {I,O}
0 if i does not vote
Let us consider now the payoff from the transfers. Given an offer by the incumbent of tdi dollars,
each citizen’s marginal value of a dollar of that offer is θi. If a citizen i in district d does not accept
the transfer offer tdi , he only gets the “expressive voting payoff”, but if he accepts it, and votes for
the incumbent, he gets an extra payoff of
θtdi .
Let qd capture the perceived monitoring probability times the punishment. Then if he accepts the
transfer and votes for the opposition, he gets
θtdi − qd.
Therefore, the sum of both terms leaves the citizen with the following utility:
udi =

0 if i does not vote
b− (XP − xi)2 if i votes for party P ∈ {I,O}
b− (XI − xi)2 + θtdi if i accepts the transfer and votes for I
b− (XO − xi)2 + θtdi − qd if i accepts the transfer and votes for O
(1)
Districts are the artifact that allows the incumbent to target his resource allocation more
efficiently in order to buy as many votes (and as much turnout) as possible. The incumbent
does not need to group voters depending only on their geographical location, but on any other
observable characteristic: unions, ethnic groups, religions, etc. This grouping needs to have two
3Notice that in this setup, expressive voting has a big role in explaining the turnout decision since, as Cox
(1999) puts it, “...act-contingent utilities rather than outcome-contingent utilities, drive turnout probabilities at the
microlevel...”. See Degan and Merlo (2009) for references.
6
main properties: first, it should enable discrimination across groups, hence each group should be
different to each other in some observable dimension; second, the distributions of preferences must
be known by the incumbent.4
Summarizing, districts differ in the technology available to monitor and punish voting behaviour
(qd), and in the underlying ideological bias drawn from F d(x). As mentioned before, with a secret
ballot (or imperfect monitoring) and two-sided lack of credibility (politicians and voters), it is
not possible to sign a contingent contract between those political actors. Hence, the incumbent
allocates its budget B before the elections to buy votes and turnout through transfers, exploiting
the observable differences across districts: the party directly observes qd, Nd, and F d(x) for each
district, and θ is observable.
A representative district
Before formally defining the vote-buying and turnout-buying thresholds, and showing their de-
pendence on the transfers, we discuss the timing of the game in a district. First, notice that all
citizens in a given district must look ex-ante identical. Therefore, the incumbent must offer the
same transfer to all citizens tdi = t
d, which depends on the budget B, the distribution of preferences
in all districts {F j}Dj=1, and the monitoring technology in all districts {qj}Dj=1. Second, each voter
maximizes his utility, represented in equation (1), by choosing whether to accept a transfer and his
voting behavior. Finally, voting takes place.
We say that an individual’s vote is bought if he votes for the incumbent when he accepts the
transfer while otherwise he would have voted for the opposition. We use the terms vote buying or
persuading interchangeably. Formally:
Definition 1 A voter with ideology xi sells his vote if :
• with no transfer, he prefers the opposition:
ui(O|no transfer) ≥ ui(I|no transfer),
• with a transfer td, he changes his mind:
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|no transfer) ≥ ui(no turnout|no transfer), and
• he does not default:
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|td).
Thus, vote buying occurs when a voter who would have turned out for the opposition party without
the transfer, now accepts the transfer and votes for the incumbent.
4We could also add a third dimension, in which within each group some citizens are non buyable, i.e. they would
not change their voting behavior as a result of transfers, or θi = 0. As long as these two subgroups can be distinguished
within each group, the results do not change.
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On the other hand, we say that a voter’s turnout is bought when he turns out to vote while
he would not have voted otherwise. Thus, we interchangeably say that he sold his turnout or he is
mobilized if:
Definition 2 A voter with ideology xi is mobilized if:
• with no transfer, he does not turn out:
ui(no turnout|no transfer) ≥ max{ui(I|no transfer), ui(O|no transfer)},
• with a transfer td, he changes his mind:
min{ui(I|td), ui(O|td)} ≥ ui(no turnout|no transfer), and
• he does not default:
min{ui(I|td), ui(O|td)} ≥ ui(no turnout|td).
Notice that the last point, no default, it is included only for completeness, since the probability
of monitoring is 1, and we assume the punishment large enough. Therefore, there is never default
to mobilization. Thus, turnout buying occurs when a voter who would not have turned out without
a transfer, now turns out to vote for either candidate. Throughout the paper when the voter votes
for I, the party who mobilized him, we call iteffective turnout buying .5
According to equation (1), and the definitions above, we can identify citizens’ types according
to whether they would turn out without a transfer, who they would vote for, and whether they are
prone to mobilization or persuasion. Thus, in the figure below we observe the “loyalists” (those
who would always turnout to vote for the incumbent) and at the opposite extreme the “opposers”
(who would turn out for the opposition, in the absence of transfers), and between them the weak
supporters (to the left of zero), and the weak opposers (to the right), who are the “mobilizable”
ones.
Lemma 1 below states that when the evaluation of the transfer is larger than the cost of cheating,
all voters who accept the transfer turn out to vote for the incumbent. The converse is also true,
when the individual value attached to an accepted transfer (θtd) is larger than the risk associated
to voting for the opposition (qd), the transfers and the monitoring technology do not suffice neither
to persuade nor to mobilize some voters. Intuitively, even the voters that are very far from the
incumbents’ platform would accept the transfers and vote for the opposition because the monetary
benefits more than compensate the expected costs of “cheating”. Hence, for those voters, vote
buying and mobilization are ineffective, in the sense that despite being bought or mobilized by the
incumbent, they vote for the opposition.
5Notice that with our definitions a voter cannot be both mobilized and persuaded. Only voters who would not
vote are the ones that can be mobilized with a transfer. Also, only citizens that vote for the opposition can be
persuaded by the incumbent. For instance, take a citizen who accepted a transfer and voted for the incumbent. If
without the transfer she prefers the opposition but does not vote, it may be a common intuition to think that she
was both mobilized and persuaded. However, our definition implies that mobilization (as well as persuasion) is aimed
at getting citizens to turn out for the incumbent, not only to vote. Under this framework, the example is a case of
mobilization only.
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Figure 1: Definition of citizens’ types in a given district
Lemma 1 If θtd ≤ qd ∀ d, then Pr(i accepts td) = Pr(i votes for I). That is, everybody who
accepts the transfer votes for I.
By focusing on this case we know the incumbent party does not transfer money to voters who
will not vote for I. That means that there is no voter i with ideology xi such that he will accept
the transfer and will not vote for I in equilibrium. Thus, the incumbent optimally chooses transfers
such that θtd ≤ qd, and all vote and turnout buying is effective.
Let b, XI , and the policy space [x, x¯] ⊂ X be such that x ≥ XI −
√
b; therefore, according to
equation (1), in equilibrium there are no extremist voters who do not turnout, and mobilization
can only occur among those voters located “between” the parties. This assumption simplifies the
analysis without loss of generality.
According to the lemma and assumptions above, following definitions 1 and 2 we obtain a vote-
buying threshold nvb(t
d), and a turnout-buying one ntb(t
d), respectively. These thresholds identify
the ideology of a voter who is indifferent between voting fot the incumbent or not, and turning out
or not, respectively. As explained in the proposition below, if a voter’s ideology is to the left of
ntb(t
d) he turns out to vote; moreover, if he votes and his ideology is to the left of nvb(t
d) then he
votes for I. In the following section, we identify these thresholds and we use Lemma 1 to identify
the conditions for mobilization and persuasion by the incumbent in a given district.
Proposition 1 For θtd ≤ qd, there exists a turnout-buying threshold ntb(td), and a vote-buying
threshold nvb(t
d), such that all voters i with
xi ∈ [x,min{nvb(td), ntb(td)}]
vote for the incumbent. Therefore,
• if ntb(td) ≤ nvb(td) then all voters with xi ∈ [XI +
√
b, ntb(t
d)] are mobilized, and none is
persuaded.
• if ntb(td) > nvb(td) then all voters with xi ∈ [XI +
√
b,XO −
√
b] are mobilized, and all voters
with xi ∈ [XO −
√
b, nvb(t
d)] are persuaded.
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Moreover,
nvb(t
d) = X¯ +
θtd
2∆X
, and ntb(t
d) = XI +
√
b+ θtd
Allocation across districts
From the previous section we know what it takes to mobilize or persuade a voter. Taking into
account those results, the incumbent decides how to allocate the budget B ≡∑dBd across districts
that differ in the cost of buying votes and/or turnout to affect the electoral outcome. Given Nd,
Bd, qd and F d(x), for all d, the local leader chooses the level of private transfers td to be offered.
For simplicity, let id denote citizen i in district d. Then, in each district d the incumbent distributes
the money so that he maximizes the share of votes VI ≡
∑
d V
d
I :
maxVI =
∑
d
Nd Pr (id votes for I) s.to B ≡
∑
d
Bd ≥ tdNdα Pr (id accepts td). (2)
Let n(td) ≡ min{nvb(td), ntb(td)} for simplicity of notation. From Lemma 1 and Proposition
1 we know that it must be the case that θtd ≤ qd, and so the probability that a voter accepts
the transfer is the same as the probability of voting for the incumbent, Pr (id votes for I) =
Pr (id accepts td), and can be written as:
F d(min{nvb(td), ntb(td)})− F d(x}) = F d(min{nvb(td), ntb(td)}) ≡ F d(n(td)). (3)
Let ∆x ≡ XO −XI > 0. Then, following the same procedure as in Dixit and Londregan (1995): 6,
we obtain an implicit solution for td:
td =
∑
d t
dmd +B∑
dm
d
−2∆x
θ
F d(n(td))
fd(n(td))
(4)
with fd(n(td)) ≡ ∂F
d(n(td))
∂td
and md ≡ tdNdfd.
In equilibrium,
∑
tdmd and
∑
md are constants.ence from (4) we see that the only thing that
drives the differences between districts is the ideological distribution. Thus, looking in detail to the
equation above, we find that the incumbent wishes to allocate greater transfers in those districts
with lower F
d
fd
, which we could define as an “inverse success voting ratio” 7. Put differently, if
6We replace equation (3) in the maximization problem (2), and take F.O.C. for a transfer in a district, say ti.
Then, we multiply the FOC on both sides by N i, and we sum over i. We obtain an equation for the lagrangian
multiplier, say λ, and we replace it in the original F.O.C. to obtain the optimal transfer.
7If the hazard ratio f
1−F is a measure of the conditional probability of failure, then in our set-up rather than
failure we measure success (F d is the probability that a citizen votes for the incumbent, or rather the percentage of
incumbent’s voters)
10
we think of the densities as positively-sloped demand functions, we can re-think our problem as
one of a geographically discriminating monopoly. We can rewrite the above equation in terms of
elasticities
td =
MCd
1 + 1
ηd
,
where ηd ≡ ∂F d(n(td))
∂td
td
F d(n(td))
, and I define the marginal cost, MC, as the change in total expendi-
tures tdF d(n(td)) when an extra voter is bought. Thus, it is optimal to focus on the districts that
are more “elastic” to transfers.
This general result can be explained in terms of the ideological leaning of each district by
focusing on their mean ideology. Thus, if a district has a low mean (i.e. close to XI), we call it a
core one. On the other hand, if a district has a large mean (closer to XO), we call it an opposition
stronghold. We call the ones in which the mean is close to the average of the platforms XI+XO2
swing districts. The following proposition establishes the conditions for focusing on opposition
strongholds, highlighting the importance of breaking the until now dichotomic discussion between
core and swing districts.
Proposition 2 Let j and h be two districts with different cdf with bounded supports J and H, in
[x, x¯], such that µj < µh. If
F j(n(tj))
fj(n(tj))
> F
h(n(th))
fh(n(th))
, then (tj , th) exists such that a greater transfer is
allocated in the opposition stronghold:
µj < µh ⇒ tj < th.
In general, for any two districts tj − th = 2∆xθ [F
h(n(th))
fh(n(th))
− F j(n(tj))
fj(n(tj))
] 8, but since we aim to
explain our results in terms of the mean of each district, we can provide examples in which we fix
the variance in the distribution. For instance, with the uniform distribution, largely used in the
literature on voting (since Downs (1957)), our proposition delivers the following:9
F d(n(td)) =
n(td)− xd
x¯d − xd then t
j − th = k(xj − xh)
Intuitively, in order to mobilize more weak supporters, and/or persuade more weak opposers,
larger transfers have to be disbursed. Nonetheless, since all voters are offered the same transfer,
8tj − th can also be written in terms of elasticities:
tj − th = η
j
ηk
ηk + 1
ηj + 1
9Or, for instance, the triangular one:
F d(t) =
(x− ad)2
(bd − cd)(cd − ad) then t
j − tk = k′′(aj − ak)
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the marginal cost of increasing the transfer by a penny to mobilize an indifferent weak supporter
is that penny times all the voters that accept the transfer (which includes all loyalists and possibly
some weak supporters). By the same reasoning, increasing the transfer to persuade a weak opposer
implies that all weak supporters and loyalists also get a larger transfer. Therefore, in order to
minimize those “wasted resources” the incumbent gives more money in districts with fewer loyalists
(i.e. opposition strongholds). On the other hand, the incumbent also faces an “upper bound” on
the individual transfers since very large transfers would incentivize the strong opposers (and some
weak) to accept it and shirk in the ballot, independently of the probability of being caught.
Figure 2: The marginal cost of buying an extra citizen
Incumbents do not waste money, therefore optimally they would never offer a transfer so big
that it would mobilize but not persuade citizens. By the same reasoning, the incumbent does not
want to waste money on loyalists that would have voted for him anyway: for any given level of
transfer, the marginal cost of getting one more vote is the total number of accepted
transfers times the increment in the transfer. Thus, districts with larger numbers of loyalists
are associated with a higher marginal cost of a vote.
Remark 1 Incumbents spend more money on persuasion and mobilization strategies in opposition
strongholds, ceteris paribus.
Also, it follows from lemma 1 above that in districts with high monitoring the citizens who
accept a transfer are more likely to vote for the incumbent, which in turns increases the incentives
to offer more transfers (Stokes (2005)).
Remark 2 Higher perceived probability of monitoring results in higher spending and higher mobi-
lization and persuasion.
Finally, since we are considering the incumbent’s problem, we have purposefully omitted the
presence of intermediaries throughout the set-up description. Political intermediaries, local party
leaders, and party brokers are thought of as agents who are relatively better informated about
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each citizen’s preferences (see Stokes (2005), Finan et al. (2009), etc) in their local community.
This assumption may allow the brokers to be more efficient and effective in exchanging goods and
services for turnout and votes; nonetheless, we consider that the brokers’ private information cannot
be exploited by the incumbents.
4 The evidence
After the 2001 political and economic crises, the Argentinian government implemented a poverty
relief programme - Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar - which gave the incumbent much discretion in the
allocation of the spending from th programme to districts and finally individuals. Moreover, at full
implementation, only around half of the potential recipients (i.e. the unemployed) were receiving
funds from this programme. Although each “individual disbursemnt” (a transfer) was fixed around
35 US dolars, the government had discretion in how much to allocate to each district, according
to the needs. These needs were formulated in a quite decentralized manner by municipalities
and individuals jointly, as community development projects that the national government could
finance. Since within these “projects” there could be different mixes of loyalists and opposers, the
discretion came through the total amount allocated to the project. With the same reasoning as in
the theoretical model, since ideologies were private knowledge, the incumbent could save money by
allocating more money where it was sure that he would reach weak opposers; that is, in opposition
strongholds.
In the remainder of this section we summarize Argentina’s political events and economic back-
ground during the crises, the institutional details of the poverty alleviating programme (PJDH),
and the electoral organization. Finally, we explain how these details allow us to use such crises as
an exogenous shock to isolate pre-campaign spending.
4.1 Economic and political environment
Background information
The presidential election system in Argentina is, as described above, a single-member district with
direct voting and runoff, held every 4 years in October. National legislative elections for both
chambers (senators and deputies) are hold every 2 years, when each chamber is partially renewed.
During the period studied, there were two main national parties in Argentina: the ALIANZA, and
the PERONIST parties.
In December 2001, an economic and political crisis exploded, prompting the resignation of
president Fernando de la Rua (from the ALIANZA party) 2 years before the end of his tenure.
However, the country’s political crisis deepened and three of his successors also resigned within a
week (the president of the Senate, the congress-appointed provisional president Adolfo Rodriguez
Saa, and the president of the House). In January 2002, the Congress appointed a new president
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until December 2003, Eduardo Duhalde (from the PERONIST party), who nonetheless called for
early elections a year fter taking power. In April 2003 new national presidential elections took place,
and the runner-up, the PERONIST Nestor Kirchner with 22% of the votes, became president in
May 2003 after the winner of the elections stepped down from the second round. The full timeline
of Argentine presidents is shown in figure (4) in the Appendix.
During his mandate, Duhalde instated a decentralized poverty alleviating programme aimed at
the unemployed population10 (“Plan Jefes de Hogar”, from now on PJDH). By 2001 there were more
than 4 million unemployed citizens (around a 18% rate of unemployment); when the programme
began in May 2002, 53% of the population were below the poverty line, the unemployment rate was
21.5%, and as high as 25.5% in some of the major cities11. Although this national plan involved
the disbursement of only 150 pesos per recipient (around us$ 40), it represented 7.5% of the total
federal budget.
Since the economic situation called for immediate action, from the onset the programme imple-
mentation had broad support from all political factions. Criticisms only grew when the urgency
was left behind, and irregularities regarding the management and allocation of the PJDH were re-
ported. Numerous reports from NGOs , the World Bank, and even some independent government
agencies signaled that the plans were not being allocated to the targeted population, that local
leaders were keeping a “commission” for the disbursement of the plan, and other irregularities.12
The elections appeared on the horizon, and the use of the plan with political purposes (clien-
telism, or vote buying) arouse as the main concern among the opposition; especially when the
current incumbent (Duhalde) openly supported Nestor Kirchner as “his” candidate. The timing of
the plan was, at least, curious since its implementation peaked during the month of the election,
and declined immediately after it.
The poverty alleviating social program
The most salient characteristics of the PJDH were its highly decentralized management and im-
plementation, and the flexible definition of the target population. In exchange for receiving money
from the PJDH, all beneficiaries had to either work in a locally based project (community-oriented
or private) or study. All the “local projects” were proposed by the local community through mu-
nicipal councils (NGOs, religious associations, small firms, local government), and evaluated by the
lowest level of government - the municipality. Once a project had been accepted, the municipality
allocated the potential beneficiaries to the projects and the national government, through the Labor
10This programme was called “Head of Households’ Programme”(our translation) and it was popularly believed
that it was aimed only at unemployed parents of children below 18 years old. Nevertheless, decree 565/2002 which
regulates its application, indicates that every unemployed person would be a legal recipient of this “plan”.
1125.5% in Cordoba and Catamarca,above 24% in Mar del Plata, Rosario, and Greater Buenos Aires.
12CIPPEC (2009) reports that 88% of the reports of clientelism regarding the social plans’ management were
related to the PJDH. Galasso and Ravallion (2004) show that a third of the recipients were not among the target
population, and that 80% of the target population did not receive a plan.
14
Ministry, paid directly to the municipality-approved list of beneficiaries. Although this feature of
the PJDH left other subnational government organizations (i.e. provinces) relegated to supervision
roles, it gave the national government room for discretion in deciding the amount disbursed to the
project. Moreover, since at its peak, the programme could budget for at most 2 million beneficia-
ries, while the unemployed population was around 4 millions, the local governments enjoyed even
more discretion in the allocation of the benefits.13
Electoral logistics
During the period studied, Argentina was divided in 24 districts: 23 provinces and Buenos Aires
city. Each district elect its own governor (called mayor in Buenos Aires city) in a majoritarian
election. Re-election was allowed for every office without restrictions except for the president, who
was only allowed to be re-elected for one consecutive term.
Voting in national elections in Argentina was mandatory for all citizens between 18 and 70 that
are not impeded by law (i.e. mentally ill, some prisoners, nationalized foreigners in non-national
elections, etc). The obligation to vote was neither enforced nor penalized; thus, the turnout rate
had varied between 60% and 80% since the return of democracy in 1983. The voting procedure
consisted of each voter entering a room (“cuarto oscuro”) and taking a ballot paper, then secretly
putting the ballot in an envelope secretly, and depositing his envelope in an urn publicly. This
procedures took place in a table, located in a circuit, located in a region in a given province.
As explained above, each province is sub-divided into regions (called “Departamentos”), and
each region is also subdivided in circuits, according to geographical and political divisions. While
most regions coincide with urban conglomerates, the organization of the circuits take into account
geographical divisions that would make voting more difficult (e.g. rivers).
Figure 3: Location of electoral tables and available data
Argentina’s turmoil
In the literature on distributive politics, politicians make credible campaign promises and after
winning, they allocate their budget according to their promises. Therefore, the vote count at time
13See the appendix for more institutional details of this programme.
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T is endogenous to spending in time T+1. Within this framework, spending on PJDH in a given
region in 2003 (T+1) could be thought of as a payoff for “good electoral performance” in 2001 (T)
in that region. However, since by 2001 the incumbent party was different to the one managing
the plan, there is no reason to think this. Moreover, by the time of the legislative election no
opposition party (ie. PERONIST) could have forecast that it would be the incumbent before the
2003 elections, and so they could not have made this kind of electoral promise. Therefore, we will
claim that spending on PLANS is caused by IDEOLOGY, and not the other way around.
Nonetheless, it could be argued that promises were made at subnational levels (by intermediaries,
mayors, or local legislators), and although they were supposed to be paid in a different way, the
PJDH was used instead. If so, that would generate a positive correlation between plans and ideology
that goes against our predictions. Since we find a negative correlation, the possibility that PJDH
was also used to pay back electoral promises from 2001 only makes our story even stronger.
4.2 Empirical strategy
Targeted spending
We show that the incumbent spends more money (allocates more plans) in those regions where
the ideological distribution of voters is biased against him. Say that the variable IDEOLOGY is
the ideological bias toward the peronist incumbent, PLANS is the number of plans allocated right
before the election, April 2003, and X is a vector that contains relevant control variables that we
explain below. Then, we prove that the coefficient β below is negative:
PLANSp,r = β.IDEOLOGYp,r,c + γ0.Xp,r,c + p,r,c (5)
When studying the equation above, two main concerns arise: how to measure IDEOLOGY, and
whether the model specification is appropriate. Regarding the latter, by design the PJDH has a
target population (unemployed) that is considered in X. We explain the remaining variables in X be-
low, but we also control for other demographic variables that may be relevant (poverty, education).
More importantly, it has been pointed that the allocation of emergency employment programmes in
Argentina may depend on institutional variables such as the number of representatives in Congress,
partisan affiliations of provincial governors, and workers’ street protests (“piqueteros”)14. We con-
trol for this institutional variation across provinces by including provincial fixed effects.
Our proxy for IDEOLOGY requires an explanation. In order to obtain a measure of the 2003
ideological bias in each circuit, IDEOLOGYp,r,c, we use the 2001 legislative elections as a proxy
for a peronist ideological bias, measured as the deviation from the national average in any given
circuit. Cox (1997) shows that proportional elections, and multipartism favor sincere voting. The
2001 elections in Argentina were legislative elections for deputies, who are elected in a proportional
14See Giraudy (2007) for a summary and results of this argument.
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basis, therefore we could expect them to be positively correlated with the true distribution of
ideologies. 15
Why do we expect the 2001 electoral outcome to reflect the true preferences of the electorate?
In particular, how do we know that the 2001 electorate was not subject to the same persuasion
and mobilization strategies that we prove existed in 2003? We use Argentina’s political turmoil
in two different ways to clarify the point. First, the crises provoked the appearance of bottom-up
political organizations that naively aimed to replace the traditional parties. The protest chant was
“QUE SE VAYAN TODOS”, that is, “THROW THEM...[THE POLITICIANS]...ALL OUT”, and
the 2001 elections were characterized by a sentiment of apathy toward the traditional parties, and
so their persuasion and mobilization strategies were weakened, and the number of effective parties
rose from 2 to 5 (Levitsky and Murillo (2008)16, Calvo et al. (2002), Sanchez (2005), Ordeshook
and Shvetsova (1994)). Second, in 2001 the party in power was ALIANZA, so if there was any
use of discretionary funds to bias the election, it would have been against the PERONIST party.
Thus, if anything, the true vote share of the PERONIST party is understated. However, since our
measure of IDEOLOGY is calculated as a deviation from the national mean, we do not risk any
such understatement.
Vote and turnout buying
Having shown that ideology biases spending, we proceed to estimate the consequences of spending.
According to our theoretical predictions above, we expect the coefficients θ and µ to be positive:
V OTESp,r,c = θ.PLANSp,r + γ1.Xp,r,c + ν
V
p,r,c (6)
TURNOUTp,r,c = µ.PLANSp,r + γ2.Xp,r,c + ν
T
p,r,c. (7)
In particular, we also control for ideology, and we find that a peronist bias has a positive effect
on the dependent variables. That is, although higher spending is allocated to other districts, the
more peronist districst (measured with the 2001 elections) still vote more for the PERONIST party.
15In order to clarify, in Cox (1997) strategic voting places an upper bound on the number of parties present under
any electoral system. When voters have to select M politicians (M being the “district magnitude”), then only M+1
parties would typically exist (as in Duverger (1963)). On the other hand, PR systems with large M favor strategic
entry of parties: that is, it allows for the representation of all social cleavages in the form of parties (although it
does not imply it necessarily). Regarding the present case, Argentina chose more than 200 deputies, proportionally,
in 2001, in a context where the traditional political parties had been split into many new parties that represented
different “social cleavages” (to use Cox’s words). Therefore, a large M with a large number of parties would result in
less strategic voting. In other words, in all circumstances, a large M with PR and many parties favours the presence
of more sincere voting.
16“The 2001-2002 crisis of governance and the economy triggered a massive withdrawal of public trust from the
political elite. [...]the percentage of Argentines expressing confidence in their country’s political parties fell from 29
percent in 1997 to a stunningly abysmal 4 percent... This crisis of representation was seen in the 2001 midterm
election when, in a striking protest against the entire political elite, 22 percent of voters cast blank or spoiled ballots.
In two of the country’s largest districts, the city of Buenos Aires and the province of Santa Fe, the number of blank
and spoiled ballots exceeded that for all parties combined.”
17
Moreover, the effect of plans on our dependent variables is also positive. Hence, although higher
spending is allocated to less peronist districts, those districts with a higher allocation of plans vote
more for the PERONIST party, although they were previously less peronist (positive and significant
θ and µ).
4.2.1 Data sources, and descriptions of variables
We use four different data sets. All demographic variables are obtained from the 2001 Argentine
Census (November 2001), and complemented with information from the INDEC (Argentine’s Na-
tional Institute of Statistics) when specified. The smallest unit of analysis in these data is regional.
The spending on “Planes Jefes y Jefas de Hogar” at the regional level was provided by the “Min-
isterio de Trabajo” (Argentine’s Department of Labor). The incumbency information is publicly
available from many different sources. Last, the electoral data was collected in the “Ministerio del
Interior” (Argentine’s Internal Affairs Ministry, similar to the Executive Office of the President in
the US). When possible, we use the electoral outcomes at the table level; however when we need to
make intertemporal comparisons (as in equation (5)), it is necessary to aggregate the data at the
circuit level. Moreover, since the political and electoral divisions of the City of Buenos Aires (po-
litically equivalent to a province) do not coincide, the only possible aggregation is to the province
level. Thus we have no variation within it, and drop it from our data set17. In the appendix, we
provide summary statistics of all variables of interest, and further explanations.
Here we explain the set of all possible variables contained in X, which vary across the estimated
equation. We use three types of controls: (1) number of “legal” potential recipients of the plan, (2)
general demographic variables such as education and poverty, and (3) institutional variables such
as incumbency, fixed effects by province, and size of tables. All demographic controls in (1) and
(2) are at the region level, while the ones in group (3) vary depending on the variable. We explain
them all below.
Dependent variables. In equation (5) we intend to explain the allocation of plans, mea-
sured by PLANSp,r. Under different specifications, we look at the effect of PLANS on votes for
the incumbent’s PERONIST candidate, at the table level - V otesTABLEp,r,c,t) - and the circuit
level - V otesCIRCUITp,r,c. Also, we look at their effect on turnout: V otersTABLEp,r,c,t, and
V otersCIRCUITp,r,c. Alternatively, we also use the log of the total number of votes and turnout
by circuit (logV OTESp,r,c and logTURNOUTp,r,c, respectively), and the logarithm of PLANS.
Potential plan recipients. As mentioned above, the poverty relieving plan is targeted at
unemployed citizens. Therefore, in equations (6) and (7) we control for the total number of unem-
17Another complication is that we use fixed effects, which would capture all the City of Buenos Aires’ demographic,
electoral and PJDH spending data variation.
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ployed people using three variables: unemployment in urban areas (with 2000 or more inhabitants),
URBANunempp,r; rural unemployment grouped in settlements of 2000 or less, and rural unem-
ployment dispersed, RURALunemp1p,r and RURALunemp2p,r, respectively. We control for these
different types of unemployment not only because there may be structural differences in the causes
of unemployment, but also there may be differences in terms of access to social benefits, political
support, party leaders, and so on. Alternatively, we also use the logarithms of these variables as
controls, and we show that the results do not change under alternative definitions of the recipient
population.
Demographics. It has been pointed out that not only the PERONIST vote is larger among
less educated poor people (see Calvo and Murillo (2004), Stokes (2005)), but also the lower income
groups are more prone to vote and turnout buying (see Stokes (2005), Nichter (2008)). There-
fore we control for the level of education using the variable loweducationp,r for the percentage
of individuals under 18 without a high school degree. Alternatively, we also use the log of the
total number of individuals without that degree: logNOHIGHSCHOOLp,r. Also, we control for
structural poverty measures using an index of the quality of households called “calmat”; which we
explain below. Moreover, we also control for the number of people with private health insurance
in logs logHEALTHp,r, as a percentage healthinsurancep,r, and just the total number of people
with such insurance tienep,r.
Monitoring and Electoral variables. Although it is not possible to observe the perceived
probability of monitoring or the “psyschological secrecy” (Gerber et al. various years)18, we use
a variable which is likely to be correlated with it. In each table there are at most 450 voters;
depending on the geography of the region and the circuit, and some randomness (ie. if the number
of potential voters is not a multiple of 450), there are many tables with fewer voters. The number
of eligible voters per table is known by the authorities in advance (by law, the first list of the
allocation of voters to tables is circulated 6 months in advance), and can be easily gauged by the
voters (who know exactly in which table they will vote 3 months in advance).
We use the number of electors (eligible voters) per table as a proxy for monitoring: when more
citizens can vote on a table, it is harder for anybody to know/guess how a given voter have cast
his ballot. On the contrary, with only a few voters per table, it is easier to deduce the vote of a
given citizen.
Thus, the size of a table is the total number of electors who could cast their ballot in ta-
ble t, in circuit c, region r and province p: see figure (??) for some summary statistics on
ELIGIBLEvotersp,r,c,t. However, since the table organization is not constant between the 2001
and 2003 elections, in (5) we calculate the average number of eligible voters per table in a cir-
18citetGerber2006, or ?
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cuit avgELIGvotersp,r,c. Besides, we introduce the total number of eligible voters by circuit
ELIGbycircuitp,r,c, the total number of tables by circuit TABLESbycircuitp,r,c, and their logs.
19
Also, when we add fixed effects per province we can estimate neither the effect of having
incumbent governors from the PERONIST party INCp, nor the effect of holding simultaneous
elections SIMp. However, we run alternative regressions that allow us to account for these effects.
Finally, we also include the variable GENDER, which takes value 1 in men’s tables, and 0 in
women’s tables.
4.3 Results
In the tables we show and discuss the results from our estimation with provincial fixed effects, and
with robust standard errors clustered at the region level. Below, we discuss those results, and their
robustness to different specifications.
Targeted spending
There are many interesting points to highlight in the results of tables (1) and (2). First, our results
confirm the hypothesis robustly across all specifications: when IDEOLOGYp,r,c in a circuit favors
the incumbent, its region receives fewer plans on average. Although we argue that the PJDH was
utilized for political purposes, it is noticeable that plans were allocated where the target population
lived: in all models, one more urban unemployed person in a region implies the allocation of around
0.4 more plans. However, as we introduce the explanatory variables into our model, we enrich the
explanation of the spending.
The effect of IDEOLOGY varies in intensity across different specifications, but it remains neg-
ative and significant among all of them. For instance, in the basic model in column 2, without
controls, if a circuit is 1% more in favor of the PERONIST party than the average circuit, then the
region receives around 30 fewer plans. In the full models, that number increases to 90, meaning
that 1% over the mean of PERONIST voters in a circuit implies 90 fewer plans on average.
Although the number of unemployed people, and the fixed effects explain around 95% of the
variability in our dataset, we are still able to show that IDEOLOGY plays the role we predicted.
That is, spending is not only biased by political motives, but it is skewed toward the regions that
oppose the current incumbent.
As mentioned, the influence of IDEOLOGY increases as we control for the interaction and insti-
tutional terms. The interaction terms captures the effect of being a core (or opposition) stronghold
combined with other relevant factors, such as incumbency (“ideologyXinc”), simultaneous elections
(“ideologyXsim”), average number of potential voters per table (“ideologyXaveragesize”), and size
19There was a reshuﬄing of tables between elections since the maximum number of voters allowed per table
increased from 350 in 2001 to 450 in 2003.
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of rural unemployment (“ideologyXrural”). None of these interaction terms are significant, except
for “ideologyXinc”, which is large and positive but smaller that the coefficient on ideology.
In other words, the effect of circuit-level ideological bias is amplified in NON PERONIST
provinces: the national incumbent’s allocation of plans is more responsive to ideology than in
PERONIST provinces. Similarly, discrimination between opposition and core strongholds in the
peronist provinces is milder: a 1% bias against the peronist party leads to 15 more plans, while a
bias toward it leads to 15 fewer plans (vs ± 95 in non-peronist provinces).
These assymetries are caused by party competition: in peronist provinces the incumbent gover-
nor might be already campaigning for the national incumbent, either through vote-buying spending
or through other means, which may imply that there are enough resources to ensure the election,
and therefore there is no need to carefully discriminate between regions. On the other hand, the
same effect in non peronist provinces might have the opposite resul: the incumbent governor cam-
paigns against the national incumbent, and therefore the competition makes the national incumbent
use his resources more efficiently.
There are two other institutional variables which play an effect consistent with our predictions,
although not simultaneously. As the average number of eligible votes per table increases, the number
of plans is reduced; that is, as it becomes harder to monitor the voters’ behavior, the allocation of
plans decreases. Also, the number of tables per circuit is a proxy of perceived monitoring: i.e. there
may only be a few tables in a circuit if there are geographical circumstances that isolate part of the
population, and then the electoral authorities “create” new circuits only for this more “isolated”
population, which therefore is easier to identify. Moreover, few tables per circuit could also be the
outcome of very small populations, in which case the effect is the same. According to our model,
higher monitoring (fewer tables) should lead to more plans. The results confirm this by showing
that one fewer table per circuit implies around 20 more plans.
Under all specifications, the log of the quality of the construction materials used to build the
houses “logPOORHOUSE” is always positive and large. This variable is constructed by adding
up all the households whose houses are poorly constructed. The censuses in Argentina record
construction materials in the following sense: if the house has secure floors, roofs and walls built
with proper isolating materials (i.e. cement) and finishing, the house is quality I. If safe but without
proper isolating materials or finishing, it is quality II. If safe, but all the floors, roofs and walls are
not built with properly isolating materials or finishing, it is rate III. Qualities IV and V are for
houses with unsafe floors, roofs, and/or walls, like tents, or very provisional constructions (typically
cardboard). We construct the index POORHOUSE by counting all the households with quality
III, IV or IV in each region. Its effect is very large: 1% percent more low quality houses increases
the allocation of plans by a thousand. This result is consistent with the anecdotal evidence in
Argentina that claims that the clientelist structures go deeper in “villas miserias” (shanty towns
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Table 1: Allocation of PLANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IDEOLOGY -28.41∗ -20.91∗ -21.86∗ -21.71∗ -34.65∗∗∗ -27.16∗∗
(-1.80) (-1.73) (-1.83) (-1.80) (-3.31) (-2.05)
avgELIGvoters -0.254 -0.277 -0.227 0.0259
(-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.42) (0.04)
TABLESbyCIRCUIT -19.95∗∗∗ -18.89∗∗∗ -18.54∗∗∗ -29.91∗∗∗
(-2.81) (-2.72) (-3.01) (-4.28)
URBANunemp 0.426∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(35.05) (36.75) (24.49) (25.24) (6.07)
RURALunemp1 0.0651 0.0854 -0.259 -0.261 -0.181
(0.07) (0.09) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.21)
RURALunemp2 0.757∗∗ 0.764∗∗ 0.512 0.416 0.376
(2.05) (2.06) (1.35) (1.07) (0.94)
logNOHIGHSCHOOL -39.93 -110.7 -233.7 749.3 1181.7
(-0.07) (-0.19) (-0.42) (1.28) (1.62)
logPOORHOUSE 895.3∗ 1113.8∗∗ 1194.0∗∗ -631.3 -115.3
(1.65) (2.05) (2.06) (-0.95) (-0.15)
population 0.00248
(0.28)
target1wonbi 0.680∗∗∗
(4.66)
target1nbi 1.315∗∗∗
(3.11)
target2wonbi 1.209∗∗∗
(4.88)
target2nbi 1.941∗
(1.80)
cons 586.8∗ 812.4∗∗ -5400.4 -6076.9 -5498.2 -2402.7 -10136.1∗∗
(1.80) (2.14) (-1.35) (-1.50) (-1.46) (-0.62) (-2.29)
N 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846
R2 0.952 0.952 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.960 0.946
adj. R2 0.951 0.952 0.953 0.954 0.954 0.960 0.946
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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on illegal plots that are initially “built” with cardboard, and similarly unstable materials)20.
Last, we control for the log of the number of INITIAL PLANS, meaning those distributed in May
2002. When the programme was introduced, the urgency to palliate poverty and unemployment
was immediate. Therefore it could be the case that the initial plans were allocated to the target
population while, after the emergency, they were used purely with clientelist motives. The positive
coefficient means that there is persistence of the motives (either urgency or clientelism), although
it is worth pointing out that the introduction of this control makes all the other effects weaker.
Summing up, we show evidence that the allocation of plans was neither entirely driven by
social/economic reasons, nor entirely driven by political ones. However, we show that the clientelist
motivation (persuasion and/or mobilization) is consistent with our predictions. Moreover, the role
played by the monitoring variables also supports the evidence that the plan allocation was skewed
for political reasons, different to the ones previously stated in the literature.
Alternative specifications: in tables (5) and (6) in the Appendix, we show different spec-
ifications that also confirm our main predictions. In all cases, the coefficient on IDEOLOGY is
negative, and significant. The main concerns regarding the model specification are regarding the
demographics of the target population, and the possibility that the results are driven by scale
effects.
We also introduce two alternative definitions of the target population, and in the last two
columns of table (1) we show that our results do not change qualitatively when we use these
variables instead of unemployment. First, we define it as households whose head is unemployed,
target1p,r; also, we look at the population under 18 years old in which according to the 2001 census
either parent is unemployed, target2p,r. Most of the research on the PJDH has focused on the
impact of this programme on poverty levels in Argentina (Cruces and Gasparini (2008), Gasparini
et al. (2009), Cruces et al. (2011)), and has defined the target population as we do with the variable
“target1”. However, since the PJDH was framed as a poverty alleviating program, it is common
to see the target population as those in extreme poverty within those households that qualify
for the programme. The measure used is “unsatisfied basic needs”: I call the households who
are target population with and without unsatisfied basic needs target1woNBIp,r, target1NBIp,r,
target2woNBIp,r, and target2NBIp,r (NBI for their acronym in spanish).
The only change we observe is that our main variable of interest stays negative, its level of
significance increases, and it becomes even more negative; that is, it is more in line with our tested
hypothesis. However, we choose to show the results with the most lax definition for our target
population for a few reasons: first, we consider that it is more in line with the decree that regulates
the program management. Second, it is the one that has a larger universe of recipients, therefore
is more consistent with our theoretical modeling.
20For such evidence, see Auyero (2000), and Zarazaga (2010). Surprisingly, in our view there is no paper that has
looked at this variable to test the anecdotal evidence.
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Table 2: Allocation of PLAN with INTERACTION terms (full table)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IDEOLOGY -93.24∗∗ -83.93∗∗ -84.87∗∗ -84.78∗∗
(-2.49) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.23)
avgELIGvoters -0.374 -0.304 -0.348
(-0.55) (-0.45) (-0.52)
TABLESbyCIRCUIT -19.33∗∗∗ -19.56∗∗∗ -18.33∗∗∗
(-2.77) (-2.86) (-2.72)
URBANunemp 0.409∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(24.14) (24.31) (25.02) (6.08)
RURALunemp1 -0.270 -0.154 -0.154 -0.0611
(-0.29) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.07)
RURALunemp2 0.349 0.345 0.255 0.208
(0.92) (0.97) (0.71) (0.57)
logNOHIGHSCHOOL -214.1 -480.1 -543.8 -687.6
(-0.37) (-0.78) (-0.89) (-1.15)
logPOORHOUSE 1109.2∗∗ 908.0∗ 1118.7∗∗ 1210.4∗∗
(2.05) (1.71) (2.11) (2.16)
ideologyXsim -2.584 -1.015 -1.254 -2.168
(-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.06)
ideologyXinc 80.13∗ 71.96∗ 71.84∗ 71.46∗
(1.91) (1.67) (1.69) (1.70)
ideologyXaveragesize 0.00244 -0.00415 0.00426 0.00709
(0.06) (-0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
ideologyXrural 0.0148 0.0134 0.0122 0.0122
(1.32) (1.16) (1.05) (1.05)
logINITIALPLANS 355.8∗∗ 358.2∗∗ 361.8∗∗∗
(2.56) (2.58) (2.62)
population 0.00284
(0.32)
cons -4784.5 -2739.2 -3443.9 -2764.9
(-1.19) (-0.67) (-0.84) (-0.71)
N 4846 4846 4846 4846
R2 0.955 0.955 0.956 0.956
adj. R2 0.955 0.955 0.956 0.956
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Vote and turnout buying
In this section we investigate the effect of a higher allocation of PJDH plans on the total number
of votes received by the incumbent’s candidate (the variable V otesp,r,c,t), and the total turnout
(V otersp,r,c,t). It is noticeable that under all the different model specifications in tables (3), (4),
and the appendix the coefficient on PLANS is always positive and significant. Moreover, although
the allocation of plans is partly explained by our measure of ideology, the effect of IDEOLOGYp,r,c
on the total votes obtained by Kirchner is positive and significant on those tables too.
Nonetheless, this time, we are not directly testing our model since we cannot observe the effect
of each transfer “individually”. Instead, we show that these transfers had an effect on votes and
turnout that is consistent with our predictions. And finally, we show different specifications that
would indicate that our story is correct.21
Table 3: Votes and voters, at the TABLE level - Persuasion and mobilization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Votes Voters Votes Voters Votes Voters
logPLANS 4.853∗∗∗ 14.95∗∗∗ 1.528∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 2.021∗∗ 3.034∗∗∗
(5.76) (17.48) (1.89) (2.88) (2.40) (6.83)
IDEOLOGY 0.774∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ -0.0855
(7.42) (-4.44) (9.73) (2.29) (8.77) (-1.08)
ELIGIBLEvoters -0.0447∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗
(-3.24) (261.93)
VotersTABLE 0.275∗∗∗
(14.40)
logELIG T -16.24∗∗∗ 147.7∗∗∗
(-4.72) (61.63)
logVoters T 46.38∗∗∗
(13.15)
cons 18.74∗∗∗ 165.5∗∗∗ -16.64∗∗ -12.50∗∗∗ -121.7∗∗∗ -597.7∗∗∗
(2.72) (22.38) (-2.45) (-4.04) (-15.66) (-44.29)
N 58851 58851 58851 58851 58851 58851
R2 0.524 0.154 0.696 0.915 0.672 0.818
adj. R2 0.523 0.154 0.696 0.915 0.672 0.818
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In order to be more detailed regarding our strategy, we look first at the most disaggregated
21Notice that testing the “individual” vote and turnout buying is imposible to prove conclusively with real data
without engaging in illegal electoral activities.
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Table 4: VotesTABLE with DEMOGRAPHIC controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logPLANS 3.803∗∗ 3.668∗∗ 2.931∗∗∗ 2.613∗∗∗ 3.780∗∗∗ 4.145∗∗∗
(2.58) (2.49) (3.58) (3.09) (3.45) (4.90)
IDEOLOGY 0.795∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗
(8.05) (8.25) (8.32) (8.29) (8.59) (8.05)
logELIG T -16.38∗∗∗ -17.54∗∗∗ -15.53∗∗∗ -16.08∗∗∗ -13.17∗∗∗ -13.47∗∗∗
(-4.76) (-4.96) (-4.47) (-4.60) (-4.77) (-5.03)
logVoters T 46.78∗∗∗ 47.89∗∗∗ 45.84∗∗∗ 46.31∗∗∗ 43.40∗∗∗ 43.54∗∗∗
(13.31) (13.30) (12.93) (13.06) (15.13) (15.46)
DEMOGRAPHICS
N 58851 58851 58851 58851 58851 58851
R2 0.673 0.674 0.677 0.677 0.687 0.698
adj. R2 0.673 0.674 0.677 0.677 0.687 0.698
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
voting data by table, so we can control for some “table characteristics” that may influence the
outcome. As mentioned above, one of those characteristics is ELIGIBLEvotersp,r,c,t, which is
related to the perceived monitoring probability. The other one is GENDERp,r,c,t; in Argentina,
men and women vote in different tables, which may be relevant since it has been pointed out that
women may have central importance in clientelist networks22. After looking at the table results,
we aggregate the voting data, and we look at the circuit-level results (to have a better idea of
the aggregated effect of plans). In that case, we control for the total number of eligible voters
- ELIGvoterscir -, the average - avgELIGvotersp,r,c -, and the number of tables by circuit -
TABLESbycircuitp,r,c.
In table (3), we show the simplest possible regressions on which both votes (odd columns)
and voters by table (even columns) are positively influenced by logPLANSp,r,c. Although our
model has variable success in explaining votes and turnout, we can say that, generally, the effect of
plans is larger on turnout than on vote buying. For instance, in column (1), a 1% increase in the
plans allocated to a region increases around 5 votes per table in that region; while it increases the
turnout by 15 voters per table. Also, columns (3) and (5) show that the monitoring variable has
the expected sign as well: for instance, one more eligible voter per table (less monitoring) decreases
the vote count. On the other hand, higher turnout increases it: one more voter per table adds 0.27
Kirchner votes, which is very similar to his national share of 24% (column 3).
22See, for instance, Auyero (2000), Galasso and Ravallion (2004), Gasparini (2005).
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In this very simple setup, as well as when we control for demographics in various different ways,
the effect of ideology is always around 0.75 extra voters with a 1% increase above the general
peronist mean. The condensed results are shown in table (4), while the full table is in the appendix
(table (??)). Moreover, the effects of the log of PLANS, the number of eligible voters, and the total
voters are also very consistent, and in all cases they have the right sign and significance. More
concisely, a 1% increase in plans increases the peronist vote count by between 3 and 4 votes per
table; and 1% bigger tables decrease that count by around 16 votes.
Furthermore, as with the allocation of plans, the overall effect of ideology depends on some
institutional features, such as whether the incumbent governor is peronist and whether there are
provincial elections being held simultaneously. In table (??) we show that although incumbency
increases the total peronist vote by table, holding simultaneous elections decreases it by more or
less the same number. Thus, in a region in a province with simultaneous elections and a peronist
incumbent the overall effect of ideology is smaller but still positive. As was pointed out when we
were investigating the effect of ideology on the allocation of plans, it is true that the effect on
votes is larger in peronist circuits in peronist provinces (around 0.85 extra votes per table per each
extra percentage of ideological bias). However, when there are simultaneous elections in a peronist
province, maybe the effect of a tougher electoral competition reduces the impact of ideology on
votes to 0.3 extra votes per table.
Similar results hold true regarding turnout in tables (??) and (??) in the appendix. The effect
of plans on turnout is always positive and significant, and most of the time larger than the effect
on votes. This may be a result of the need for a different model to explain turnout, or may simply
mean that plans are a better tool for mobilizing rather than persuading voters.
Some other empirical regularities hold across all models. The most noticeable is that gender
matters greatly. In male tables the turnout is on average 10 citizens fewer than in female tables.
Although these results are conditional on demographics, they are not conditional on female demo-
graphics with respect to male. Hence, two concerns may arise. First, we could think that since
there are more women, more should turn out. However, not only do we control for the eligible
voters per table but also, more women (if anything) should have the opposite effect. That is, since
they have higher life expectancy, then across the elderly population (where voting is not manda-
tory), the turnout should be smaller. Nonetheless, the opposite is true: women vote more than
men, consistently. Second, women are on average less educated and less wealthy, all character-
istics that would account for lower turnout (see ?), nonetheless, we find the opposite. Far from
puzzling, this could be due to the role women play in distributing food and medicine within the
clientelist networks (Auyero (2000)), or the effect of the PJDH directly, since women were largely
overrepresented in the recipient population (Galasso and Ravallion (2004), and Gasparini (2005)),
as mentioned above.
Regarding ideology, although a circuit ideologically leaning toward the peronist party increases
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the peronist vote, it decreases turnout. The effect is negative and small or non-significant in all
the specifications. However, the interaction term of ideology with incumbency is positive and
significant. This implies that in circuits favorable to the peronist incumbent, the turnout increases.
Also, consistent with the historical and anecdotal evidence that links the PERONIST party to
lower income voters, poverty - measured using the number of poorly constructed houses - increases
the votes and turnout at the district level in a significant way. 23
4.3.1 The cost of a vote: summary of results.
We build a quick example that summarizes the results and shows the incidence of the ideological
preferences of voters on the allocation of spending, and the effect of the plans on the total peronist
vote count. With this goal, we show the results, aggregating votes by circuits. Although we lose
some information and precision by doing so, we can make the interpretation of the coefficients in
a more transparent way. To do this, we always look at the most conservative estimate: ie. the
smallest coefficients in table(??); and at the average allocation of plans to the median region. An
increase in 1% in the allocation of plans to a region accounts for around 140 extra votes in each
circuit. The median is 7 circuits per region; therefore, that would be around 980 extra votes per
region. The average number of plans per region is around 3900, therefore, a conservative estimate
would indicate that a vote costs around $40. Similarly, the cost of an extra voter is around $15.
If instead, we rely on the estimates by table, 3900 plans in a region imply 2.6 votes per table. In
the median circuit there are 11 tables. That is a cost of around $180 per vote. A less conservative
estimate (column 6 in table (4)) would leave it at $116. If instead we look at the median allocation
of plans - 1200 - then the median effect on a median region is between $42 and $71 per vote.
Using the cheapest and most expensive estimates of the price of a vote, we now calculate the
total number of votes that the government could have bought at the peak of the plan: 1.9 million
recipients at $35 per plan involves 66 million dollars. In turn, that implies between 0.4 and 1.6
million voters, in an election with 17 million voters. Kirchner finally became president with less
than 4 million votes, which implies that betwen 10% and 40% of his votes could have been obtained
through the PJDH. Without these votes, he might have ended up in 3rd place, without acces to
the runoff stage. Naturally, these calculations do not take into account any welfare considerations,
and only provide a back-of-an-envelope estimate, which varies greatly (between 40 and 180 dollars
per vote).
23Alternative specifications are possible. Although in the allocation of plans, simultaneous elections did not
matter, they do in the total peronist votes. Therefore, electoral competition - dismissed everywhere else - matters.
How does this affect our estimations? In our model, we only have information on the spending by the national peronist
incumbent by region on a poverty-relieving plan that has been used in a clientelist way, or rather as campaigning. It
is reasonable to assume that the opposition parties, knowing this situation, also exert some effort in those (and other)
regions, but we do not observe that “effort”. Therefore, if we re-interpret the coefficient of plans as the differential
spending per region between the national peronist party and the national opposition, we might be underestimating
the effect of PLANS. Full tables for alternative specifications for turnout and votes, at the table and circuit levels
can be found in the appendix.
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5 Conclusion
Our contribution enriches the literature on distributive politics by showing that the dichotomic
discussion between swing and core districts should acknoledge the possibility of a third hyphotesis:
in a single-member election, like a presidential campaign with direct voting, opposition strongholds
are the optimal target for an incumbent who intends to persuade and or mobilize citizens.
We do so by building a theoretical model that departs from the existing literature by assuming
that individuals’ preferences are unobserved (as opposed to Stokes (2005)), that the incumbent
spends money on individual transfers rather than on campaign promises or advertisements, that
function like local public goods (as in Stromberg (2008), Dixit and Londregan (1995), etc). We
test our predictions with data from the presidential elections in Argentina during 2003. Besides,
we exploit the 2001 political and economic crises as an exogenous shock that allows us to estimate
the ideological leaning of each circuit, and to separate persuasion and mobilization strategies from
campaign promises.
Theoretically, our contributions to the individual persuasion and mobilization literature are
that, first, we deal with the double credibility problem and we allow for the coexistence of persuasion
and mobilization strategies. Thus, while the perception of monitoring and the upfront payments
solve the commitment problem, the parties engage in clientelist strategies depending on their limited
knowledge of the distribution of preferences. Second, since we do not believe that parties know the
ideology of each voter, they have to pay a price for the votes (or turnout) that only depends on
observable differences. This takes us to the optimal allocation problem. Our contribution to the
distributive politics literature is delivered by aggregating our results, and exploiting the observable
differences across districts or groups. We show that the allocation of upfront payments goes to
opposing districts rather than to ex-ante core (Cox and McCubbins (1986)) or swing districts
(Dixit and Londregan (1995), and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)). However, consistently with Cox
2006, within an opposing district the equilibrium transfer is allocated in the following order: first,
strong supporters that would vote for the incumbent anyway get the transfer (these are the “wasted
resources”). Secondly the weak opposers receive the transfer and they are mobilized to vote for the
incumbent. And lastly, if the transfer is large enough, weak opposers are persuaded to vote for the
incumbent as well. As previously mentioned, these results hold because the incumbent party wants
to minimize the money spent on voters who would have voted for the incumbent in the absence of
transfers.
Empirically, we find that the national incumbent from the Peronist Party allocates a larger
number of PJDH plans to circuits where the party has less support. Moreover, we also find that
when the provincial governors do not belong to the Peronist Party, this effect is amplified by
allocating more plans to opposition strongholds in non peronist provinces than in the peronist
ones. Therefore, although the plans were mainly allocated accordingly to the target population,
there is a bias towards opposition strongholds. Moreover, although all the demographic variables
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have the expected sign, we highlight the large effect of poorly constructed houses on the allocation
of plans because of arguably large presence of the peronist party in poor towns (or shanty towns,
according to anecdotal evidence).
We also find that the effect of perceived monitoring is large and significant, not only in explaining
the allocation of plans but also votes and turnout. We also find that circuits more biased toward
the peronist party vote more for that party, but have smaller turnout rates, probably due to less
intense electoral competition. Another new result is that women-only tables turn out more. This is
consistent with the role of women in the clientelist networks and the fact that they were recipients
of the PJDH disproportionally. The remaining demographic and institutional variables have the
expected signs: simultaneous elections are more competitive, incumbency is important to get more
votes, and more poverty and less education favors the peronist party.
Finally, we find not only that the incumbent behaved strategically while allocating the spending
on a poverty alleviating plan, but also that the money spent has an influence in mobilizing and
persuading citizens to vote for the incumbent. Using our most conservative measures of the price of
a vote and turnout during this period, we estimate that the Peronist incumbent could have bought
between 0.4 and 1.6 million votes out of an electorate of 17 million voters.
In sum, we test the implications of a direct presidential campaign under the presence of the
individual allocation of resources with the aim of persuading and mobilizing voters, and we show
that, contrary to the previous predictions in the literature, an optimal campaigner focuses on
opposition strongholds rather than safe or swing districts. These results come from our theoretical
model and suggest that the debate on optimal campaigning and distributive politics should be
enriched by exploring a third alternative: allocating more effort on opposition strongholds.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs
Lemma 1.
For the proof of Lemma 1, we need to prove that when the value of the transfer is larger than the cost of
cheating, tdIθ > q
d, all voters accept the transfer
min{ui(I|td), ui(O|td)} ≥ max{ui(I|no transfer), ui(O|no transfer)}, ∀ i,
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and all to the right X¯ + q
d
2∆X
vote for the opposition nonetheless. Thus, all transfers to those voters are
ineffective, since they vote as they would have voted before the transfers. On the contrary, if θtd ≤ qd, then
all voters who accept the transfer vote for the incumbent.
Proof. It suffices to show that ∀xi ≥ X¯:
ui(O|td) ≥ui(O|no transfer) (8)
⇔
b− (XO − xi)2 + θtd − qd ≥b− (XO − xi)2 ⇔ θtd ≥ qd
And ∀xi ≥ X¯ + q
d
2∆X
:
ui(O|td) ≥ui(I|td)
⇔
b− (XO − xi)2 + θtd − qd ≥b− (XI − xi)2 + θtd ⇔ xi ≥ X¯ + q
d
2∆X
And so, for θtd ≤ qd,
ui(O|td) ≤ ui(O|no transfer) ≤ ui(I|td),
where the first inequality follows from (8), and the second one holds for all xi ≤ X¯ + tdθ2∆X
Proposition 1.
The intuition is as follows: only consider party I for now and define two thresholds such that for any citizen
i in district d whose ideology lies to the left of the turnout-buying threshold (ntb(t
d)) then that citizen votes.
And if his ideology is to the left of the vote buying threshold (nvb(t
d)), then he votes for the incumbent.
Hence, suppose that ntb(t
d) ≥ nvb(td), then all the voters whose ideology is between these thresholds, if any
would vote for the opposition because the incumbent paid them enough to turnout but not enough to vote
for I. On the other hand, if ntb(t
d) ≤ nvB(td), then those voters in between the threshold would vote for the
incumbent if they were paid enough to turn out. Thus, the smaller threshold is the one that always binds.
Proof. Individual i with xi ≤ X¯ prefers to accept the transfer td ≥ q
d
θ and vote for I to not voting if
td ≥ qdθ , and if:
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(no turnout|no transfer)⇔ |xi −XI | ≤ ±
√
b+ θtd. (9)
Call ntb(t
d) ≡ XI +
√
b+ θtd, and notice that if there is only one party P , then a voter is mobilized if his
ideology is such that:
xi ∈ [XP +
√
b,min{XP +
√
b+ θtd, x¯d}] (10)
Or,
xi ∈ [max{XP −
√
b+ θtd, xd}, XP −
√
b] (11)
For all i, the citizen prefers to accept the transfer td ≥ qdθ and vote for I to voting for O without the transfer
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if:
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|no transfer)⇔ xi ≤X¯ + θt
d
2∆X
. (12)
Define nvB(t
d) ≡ X¯ + θtd2∆X . We do not focus on the case of accepting the transfer and voting for O because
that is ruled out by Corollary 1. Hence, if ntb(t
d) > nvB(t
d), then:
xi ≤ X¯ + θt
d
2∆X
⇒ xi ≤ XI +
√
b+ θtd ⇒
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|no transfer)
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(no turnout|no transfer)
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|td)
Then, for all i with xi ≤ nvB(td) votes for I. On the other hand, if
X¯ +
θtd
2∆X
≤ xi ≤ XI +
√
b+ θtd ⇒
ui(I|td) < ui(O|no transfer)
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(no turnout|no transfer)
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|td)
Then, for all i with nvB(t
d) ≤ xi ≤ ntb(td), would vote for O, without accepting the transfer.
Furthermore, if nvB(t
d) ≥ ntb(td) then for xi ≤ ntb(td), it is straightforward that i would vote for I. And
for ntb(t
d) ≤ xi ≤ nvB(td), the following holds:
XI +
√
b+ θtd ≤ xi ≤ X¯ + θt
d
2∆X
⇒
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|no transfer)
ui(I|td) < ui(no turnout|no transfer)
ui(I|td) ≥ ui(O|td)
Thus, citizen i would not vote. Notice that so far, along the proof we have dismissed the “bound” of XO−
√
b,
because if ntb(t
d) = nvB(t
d) then XO −
√
b = ntb(t
d) = nvB(t
d).
Proposition 2.
Assume θtd ≤ qd for all d; and that the budget B is large enough such that n(td) = nvb(td = X¯ + θtd2∆x .
Proof.
max
∑
d
NdF d(n(td)) s.to B ≥
∑
d
F d(n(td))Ndtd
Then, from the FOC for ti we obtain:
θ
2∆x
f i(n(ti))N i = N iλ[tif i(n(ti))
θ
2∆x
+ F i(n(ti))].
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And diving this equation by
θ
2∆x
f j(n(tj)) = λ[tjf j(n(tj))
θ
2∆x
+ F j(n(tj))],
obtained from tj ’s FOC, we get:
f i(n(ti))
f j(n(tj))
=
tif i(n(ti)) θ2∆x + F
i(n(ti))
tjf j(n(tj)) θ2∆x + F
j(n(tj))
,
which can be rewritten as
tj − ti = 2∆x
θ
[
F i(n(ti))
f i(n(ti))
− F
j(n(tj))
f j(n(tj))
]
6.2 The Blotto game
In this section we construct a game in which both parties can spend money, but the incumbent enjoys an
spending advantage 1γ , which could come either from a “clientelist” advantage, or just a larger amount of
resources.
We simplify the problem by assuming that in each district there is a fixed proportion of opposition
voters pO, and that the remaining voters are split between loyalist to the incumbent and “uninformed” or
undecided ones - pdI and u
d respectively - such that:
1 = pO + p
d
I + u
d
Therefore we caractherize each district in terms of the ratio pdI/pO. A core district is one with a large ratio
of loyalists to opposers, a swing district would be one with a similar proportion of loyalists to opposers, and
an opposition stronghold would be one with a large ration of opposers to loyalists. Thus the maximization
problem that parties face is choosing the distribution of transfers in each district such as they maximize
total votes; for the incumbent:
max
{FdI }D1
∑
d
µdNdPrd(tI > γtO) s.to B.C. TI =
D∑
d
Nd∑
i
tdI (13)
Claim 1 There is no PSNE in this Colonel Blotto game. That is, for any unit mass point of F dp′ , exists a
distribution of transfers such as party p wins for sure that district, spending as much as p′. (Myerson 1993)
Proposition 3 Given (TI , TO, γ) , the unique mixed strategy nash equilibrium when TI >O has:
• F dI (t) = t2TI
γNu
µd
for t ∈ [0, 2TI µ
d
γNu ]
• F dO(t) = 1− γTOTI + t2TI
γTO
TI
γNu
µd
for t ∈ [0, 2TI µ
d
γNu ]
Thus, the incumbent’s expected share of uninformed voters is Nu[1 − γTO2TI ]. For a formal proof of the
proposition look at section 5.1 in the appendix.
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There are a couple of interesting results with respect of the political competition for the uninformed
voters. In general terms, individuals in the districts with larger amounts of uninformed µd,s receive larger
transfers from both parties. Regarding the expected transfers, in district d from the incumbent party is we
get E(td,sI ) = T
s
I
µd,s
γNu,s , while from the opposing party: E(t
d,s
O ) = T
s
O
µd,s
Nu,s . Regarding the variance for the
incumbent and opposing party we get V (tdI) = (
T sI µ
d,s
3γNu,s )
2 and V (tdO) = T
s
O(
µd,s
Nu,s )
2[
4T sI
3γ − T sO] respectively.
6.3 Empirical evidence
The “Program Jefes de Hogar”
It has been pointed out that the implementation of the “Program Jefes de Hogar” (PJDH) was characterized
by a high level of decentralization, not only in terms of its execution but also in the formulation of needs.
Although the PJDH was designed by the national government as an “universalistic” poverty-alleviating
social program (see Galasso and Ravallion (2004)), its implementation required the potential beneficiaries
to reach the local institutions to be able to receive the money. The target population, widely thought of as
the unemployed heads of households, is by decree 565/02 defined as those, and also all “young” unemployed
and elderly not receiving any other social plan. With this very lax definition of the target population, every
unemployed citizen was legally a potential recipient of the plan.
The structure of the PJDH implies the involvement of three subnational mixed government institutions,
two of them specially created to implement it: the Provincial Consultative Council (PCC), the Municipal
Consultative Council (MCC), and the Municipalities. The PCC - specially created - was usually composed
of a member of the current provincial government, plus representatives of provincial NGOs such as unions,
religious associations, and other non-profit associations. The MCC were also composed of local government
representatives and NGOs. The average size of a municipality varies widely between provinces but they are
the lowest level of government in Argentina, and therefore any delegation to the municipalities represents
the highest possible decentralization.
The bottom-up structure of the PJDH requires that the local institutions mentioned identify needs in the
community - cleaning a street, painting a school, etc -, and elaborate projects within the MCC to be presented
to the municipality. In turn, the municipality decides whether to approve the project; if approved, out of
the registry of potential beneficiaries (voluntarily enlisted), it assigns beneficiaries to the projects. It will be
clear now, that as a counterpart of the PJDH, the beneficiaries of the program have to work in community
projects (i.e. NGO-proposed projects) or in productive activities (ie. privately-proposed projects), or they
can opt to take training courses (either formal education, or professional training).
The national government pays directly to the beneficiaries selected by the municipalities. Therefore the
MCCs and the municipalities are the most important actors in the formulation of needs, the registry of
potential beneficiaries, the execution of the PJDH and the distribution of funds. The role of the PCCs is
relegated to the supervision of certain irregularities, and to assist MCCs to solve disputes. All the information
in this section comes from decree 565/02, resolution 312/02 from the “Labor Ministry”, and Galasso and
Ravallion (2004).
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Figure 4: Time line - Presidential succession in Argentina
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Table 5: Different model specifications - Allocation of PLANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IDEOLOGY -83.93∗∗ -85.09∗∗ -78.75∗∗ -82.79∗∗ -82.72∗∗ -71.13∗∗ -65.84∗∗
(-2.21) (-2.23) (-2.15) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-2.00) (-2.01)
avgELIGvoters -0.334 -0.458 -0.198 -0.217 -0.644 -0.653
(-0.50) (-0.68) (-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.98) (-1.00)
ELIGvotersCIRC -0.0418∗∗ -0.0394∗∗ -0.0286∗ -0.0292∗ -0.0419∗∗∗ -0.0455∗∗∗
(-2.56) (-2.42) (-1.71) (-1.76) (-2.61) (-2.79)
logINITIALPLANS 355.8∗∗ 361.3∗∗∗ 360.1∗∗∗ 394.3∗∗∗ 387.6∗∗∗ 255.4∗ 268.0∗∗
(2.56) (2.61) (2.72) (2.78) (2.75) (1.89) (2.07)
URBANunemp 0.406∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(24.31) (6.02) (6.64) (6.20) (6.05) (6.50) (3.95)
RURALunemp1 -0.154 -0.0517 -0.187 -0.241 -0.183 -0.375 0.102
(-0.17) (-0.06) (-0.23) (-0.28) (-0.21) (-0.48) (0.12)
RURALunemp2 0.345 0.213 0.492 0.580∗ 0.555∗ 0.170 0.113
(0.97) (0.58) (1.51) (1.77) (1.70) (0.48) (0.28)
ideologyXsim -1.015 -2.284 -6.974 4.514 5.318 8.357 9.708
(-0.03) (-0.06) (-0.20) (0.12) (0.15) (0.23) (0.26)
ideologyXinc 71.96∗ 71.74∗ 68.09∗ 72.98∗ 72.93∗ 71.20∗ 59.58∗
(1.67) (1.70) (1.65) (1.69) (1.69) (1.77) (1.78)
ideologyXaveragesize -0.00415 0.00747 0.0282 0.0159 0.0149 0.0114 0.00939
(-0.11) (0.20) (0.80) (0.47) (0.44) (0.32) (0.26)
ideologyXrural 0.0134 0.0122 0.0119 0.0124 0.0125 0.00439 0.00411
(1.16) (1.05) (0.94) (1.03) (1.04) (0.40) (0.40)
logNOHIGHSCHOOL -480.1 -684.7 -4885.6∗∗
(-0.78) (-1.14) (-2.53)
logPOORHOUSE 908.0∗ 1190.7∗∗ 2159.4∗∗∗
(1.71) (2.12) (2.83)
population 0.00313 -0.0000482 0.000931 0.00127 -0.00172 0.0152
(0.35) (-0.01) (0.10) (0.13) (-0.20) (0.47)
logHEALTH 3003.7∗∗
(2.24)
loweducation 16.55 8.428 34.25 -34.40
(0.32) (0.17) (0.66) (-0.53)
lowqualityhouse -158.2 -183.0
(-1.53) (-1.64)
healthinsurance -16.37 77.81∗
(-0.55) (1.68)
logcalmati -8.839 170.7
(-0.02) (0.49)
logcalmatii 186.9 117.8
(0.68) (0.45)
logcalmatiii 0 0
(.) (.)
logcalmativ -172.8 -578.2∗
(-0.53) (-1.90)
logcalmatv 935.6∗∗∗ 851.8∗∗∗
(3.13) (3.21)
tiene -0.0222
(-0.55)
cons -2739.2 -2682.8 4034.5 -1311.7 348.2 -9064.1 1876.4
(-0.67) (-0.69) (0.93) (-0.32) (0.08) (-1.33) (0.25)
N 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846
R2 0.955 0.956 0.957 0.956 0.956 0.958 0.958
adj. R2 0.955 0.956 0.957 0.955 0.955 0.958 0.958
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Different model specifications - Allocation of logPLANS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
IDEOLOGY -0.033∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.0018 -0.015∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗
(-5.04) (-3.81) (1.38) (-2.88) (-2.77) (-2.49) (-2.45) (-2.63) (-2.85) (-2.56) (-2.57)
ELIGvotersCIRC -0.000082∗∗ 0.000020∗∗∗ -0.000096∗∗∗ 0.000022∗∗∗
(-2.55) (6.71) (-2.99) (7.40)
avgELIGvoters 0.00020∗ 0.000082 0.00019∗ 0.000063 0.000079
(1.79) (0.74) (1.83) (0.59) (0.74)
TABLESbyCIRCUIT 0.041∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗
(2.98) (3.44) (7.08)
URBANunemp 0.000029∗∗∗ 0.000028∗∗∗ 0.0000028∗∗∗ 0.000021∗∗∗ 0.000020∗∗∗ 0.000018∗∗∗ 0.000018∗∗∗ 0.0000027 0.000012 0.0000050 0.0000043
(7.56) (6.99) (2.97) (6.58) (6.35) (6.53) (6.40) (0.22) (0.89) (0.40) (0.35)
RURALunemp1 0.00037∗ 0.00042∗∗ -0.00017∗∗ 0.00024 0.00038∗∗ 0.00034∗∗ 0.00034∗∗ 0.00039∗∗∗ 0.00040∗∗∗ 0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00038∗∗∗
(1.88) (1.98) (-2.33) (1.36) (2.22) (2.21) (2.21) (2.82) (2.71) (2.77) (2.78)
RURALunemp2 0.00019∗ 0.00026∗∗ 0.000069∗ 0.00042∗∗∗ 0.00036∗∗∗ 0.00039∗∗∗ 0.00038∗∗∗ 0.00034∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗∗ 0.00033∗∗∗ 0.00034∗∗∗
(1.82) (2.40) (1.93) (4.36) (4.07) (4.65) (4.56) (4.22) (3.97) (4.18) (4.20)
ideologyXsim -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(-1.01) (-1.29) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.13) (-1.13)
ideologyXinc 0.014∗∗ 0.0080 0.0072 0.0070 0.0065 0.0069 0.0072 0.0064 0.0064
(1.99) (1.46) (1.39) (1.34) (1.27) (1.41) (1.42) (1.31) (1.32)
ideologyXaveragesize 0.0000083 0.000026∗∗∗ 0.000021∗∗∗ 0.000017∗∗ 0.000017∗∗ 0.000017∗∗ 0.000021∗∗∗ 0.000018∗∗ 0.000018∗∗
(0.96) (3.49) (2.96) (2.36) (2.41) (2.43) (2.99) (2.48) (2.48)
ideologyXrural 0.000013∗∗∗ 0.0000083∗∗∗ 0.0000083∗∗∗ 0.0000081∗∗∗ 0.0000084∗∗∗ 0.0000079∗∗∗ 0.0000082∗∗∗ 0.0000083∗∗∗ 0.0000082∗∗∗
(4.86) (3.39) (3.78) (3.75) (3.87) (3.85) (3.85) (3.98) (3.96)
logNOHIGHSCHOOL 0.84∗∗∗
(8.45)
logPOORHOUSE 0.20∗∗
(2.00)
loweducation -0.067∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(-5.52) (-7.13) (-6.62) (-6.74) (-5.78) (-6.23) (-5.91) (-5.88)
lowqualityhouse -0.066∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
(-2.02) (-3.47) (-3.54) (-3.47) (-3.71) (-3.53) (-3.60) (-3.63)
healthinsurance -0.046∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(-4.77) (-4.46) (-4.51) (-4.75) (-4.90) (-4.76) (-4.76)
population 0.0000022 0.0000011 0.0000019 0.0000020
(1.16) (0.54) (0.99) (1.04)
cons 7.35∗∗∗ 7.24∗∗∗ -2.69∗∗∗ 13.3∗∗∗ 18.0∗∗∗ 17.3∗∗∗ 17.4∗∗∗ 16.7∗∗∗ 17.8∗∗∗ 16.9∗∗∗ 16.8∗∗∗
(66.39) (69.52) (-6.26) (14.66) (13.76) (13.33) (13.50) (12.86) (13.04) (13.00) (12.97)
N 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846 4846
R2 0.623 0.605 0.862 0.715 0.735 0.748 0.746 0.750 0.735 0.747 0.748
adj. R2 0.620 0.602 0.861 0.713 0.733 0.746 0.744 0.748 0.733 0.745 0.746
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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